

**Saviour of the Nation, Patron of the Bourgeoisie:
A Bonapartist Characterisation of the Coup of 12 September 1980**

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Abstract: This study problematises the coup d'état of 12 September 1980, perpetrated by a group of high-ranking Turkish military officers against the elected government of Süleyman Demirel, and its relationship to class dynamics in late 1970s Turkey. The paper works backwards from the effects of the coup and the policies implemented by both the military régime and the civilian governments of the 1980s in order to reorganise the actors in the coup and their motivations according to class interests. It applies the definition of Bonapartism as developed by the Greco-French thinker Nicos Poulantzas to the events of 12 September 1980, aligning class factions within contemporary Turkish society with the theoretical elements contained in Poulantzas' thesis. This framework identifies the Bonapartist régime as a transitional process between a period of infighting among factions within the dominant class to a stage at which the successful faction of the dominant class seizes control of the organs of the State. Although the Bonapartist régime acts nominally in the interests of the entire polity or even a dominated class, its policies are clearly in the interests of a faction of the dominant class. In this vein, the paper describes the manner in which the military asserted that it had seized power in order to stem the double threat of intra-class violence and rampant inflation, but implemented policies targeted at reducing the purchasing and bargaining power of the workers and liberalizing the country's economy. It thus argues that, despite the coup régime's national, supra-class rhetoric, it worked to refashion Turkey in a manner most conducive for the political and economic ascendancy of the business-oriented faction known as the Anatolian Tigers.

Introduction

The Turkish academic Keyder Çağlar has argued that 20th century Turkey most resembled a Latin American nation rather than any of its western neighbours, despite its geographic and cultural links to southern Europe (1990, 178). Indeed, the recurrent currency and sovereign debt crises, military interventions, deadlocked parliamentary politics, and close links to the United States in the latter half of the 20th century all combined to endow the modern Turkish state with a profile of characteristics more often associated with Argentina than with Spain. Rather than resorting to a narrative of Turkish exceptionalism based on differences between the historical development of Turkey and the states of its immediate region, recourse to broader frames of analysis, and indeed theoretical frameworks, is advisable. This study opts for the second route, utilising the works of Nicos Poulantzas, a Greek-born French theorist, in order to analyse the 1980 coup that fundamentally altered the political landscape of modern Turkey.

While Poulantzas was often occupied with the underlying social, economic, and political issues that motivated the emergence of reactionary régimes in various European countries, he also addressed such phenomena in more theoretical terms. In his writings on the intersections of political

power and classes, the Bonapartist state is identified as a specific organisation distinguished from Caesarist régimes and other authoritarian forms of government. Bonapartism arises from an inability of the bourgeoisie to capture political, and thus economic and social, power through the parliamentary system, rather than an impasse between bourgeois and worker organisations. This inability stems from infighting amongst factions of the bourgeoisie (Poulantzas 1982, 283-284). A separate force thus emerges which captures the State and its apparatuses, declaring its autonomy from the economic struggle between the various classes of the given society. This force need not be divorced completely from the bourgeoisie, despite the perception of its independence. Nevertheless, it must have the sufficient physical, moral and organisational strength to capture and hold the levers of power. In the example examined by Marx and elaborated by Poulantzas, it was the military forces under Louis Napoléon who led this force. It declares its identity as one of national saviour, uniting the nation's disparate groups under a common cause, to the detriment of individual or class interests. The Bonapartist actors might then publically identify with concerns and grievances of particular non-dominant or dominated groups, but they act as a *de facto* promoter of the interests of specific factions of the bourgeoisie (Poulantzas 1982, 286). Once the Bonapartist ruling class successfully purges the bourgeoisie of opposing factions and cows the dominated classes, its régime collapses and is replaced by a parliamentary one captured by the newly unified bourgeoisie.

It is my contention that the coup of 12 September 1980, in which the democratically elected government of Süleyman Demirel was overthrown by the Turkish Armed Forces, fits this definition of a Bonapartist ascension to power. This essay will therefore rely, *grosso modo*, on the above definition and will argue that three specific aspects of the post-coup era were particularly indicative of the Bonapartist nature of the army's action:

- (1) The adoption of inflation controls and an end to anarchy as the two primary concerns of the post-coup régime, aligning the nominal interests of the Junta with those of the workers and peasants;
- (2) The emergence of an export-oriented capitalist class throughout the 1980s, to the detriment of both small, inward-oriented producers and workers, as a product of the Junta's liberalisation policies;
- (3) The Generals' rhetoric and concern for national unity, de-politicisation, and the creation of a class-neutral basis for social solidarity and cohesion.

Prior to discussing the nominal goals of the coup d'état planners, however, it is important to establish the class composition of Turkish society in the decades leading up to the events of 12

September 1980. A brief overview of class divisions will provide greater insight into the mechanics of the coup and its impact on society at large.

Class Structure in 1970s Turkey

Turkey's turbulent 1970s began on 12 March 1971, the date on which the leadership of the Turkish military forced the collapse of the democratically elected government headed by Süleyman Demirel (Zürcher 2012, 258). After the coup, left-wing and ultra-right wing political organisations flourished both inside and outside of the parliamentary system, as legislative power shifted between right-wing parties (always under the Prime Ministership of Süleyman Demirel) and left-wing parties (under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit) (Zürcher 2012, 261). Despite the near-constant collapse and reconstitution of governments of both the left and right, little attempt was made at altering the country's general adherence to Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). As a result of ISI and chronic economic mismanagement, levels of inflation, labour unrest, balance of payments problems and productivity stagnation reached crisis proportions by the end of the decade (Zürcher 2012, 267-268). A structural reform package backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was announced in January 1980 under the leadership of Finance Minister Turgut Özal, but was not implemented until after the military coup of 11 September 1980, as will be discussed below (Zürcher 2012, 278-281).

The opportunities and hardships of the 1970s allowed for the expansion and contraction of extant social classes, and put some groups in direct opposition to one another. While there is no universally agreed-upon definition of a class¹, Marxists, relying on the works of Lenin, generally define it as groups of individuals within a historically-determined system of social production. These groups have a relationship to the system of production implied by their particular role in it. Classes are further defined by their appropriation of the work of others, as well as the relative share of social wealth they receive and the means by which they receive it (Iziga Nuñez 1994, 21). The Turkish

¹ Class, or social stratification, is a sociological concept that is challenged by sociologists and non-sociologists on a number of levels. The concept of stratification, borrowed from geology, is seen as ignoring the interaction between various classes that occurs naturally in any society. Moreover, socio-economic groupings or strata are often difficult to dissociate from status groupings based on gender, race, ethnicity or age (Saunders 1990, 2-4). The application of class-based social change models to non-Western societies has also been identified as problematic by Marx himself. The absence of certain Western classes in non-Western societies can, occasionally, make processes of social change appear to be non-existent in these societies (Göçek 1996, 3-4). I keep these caveats in mind, but believe that a class-based model is applicable to Turkey in 1980, as the country had undergone nearly 55 years of intensive, top-down marketisation and Europeanisation. Moreover, I have chosen a Marxist-Leninist definition of class structure in order to provide for greater consistency with Poulantzas' theory, which is also based upon Marxist-Leninist theory. Other definitions of class can be found, particularly with reference to non-Western societies (see, for example, Göçek 1996 and Keyder 1992).

academic İbrahim Türk has identified four different broad groupings or classes present in mid-20th century Turkey: the bourgeoisie, landlords, workers and peasants. Türk further refined the concept of the bourgeoisie into three sub-categories:

- the national bourgeoisie, who, following the War of Independence (1919-1923), acquired capital in the form of banks and financial concerns, factories, rolling stock, means of transportation, and other capital goods and productive facilities (Türk 1970, 46);
- the comprador bourgeoisie, who acted as agents for foreign capital within Turkey and were largely members of ethno-religious minority groups. These groups dwindled precariously following the Exchange of Populations in 1923-30² (Türk 1970, 49);
- and the petite bourgeoisie, a motley group consisting of artisans, teachers, students, intellectuals, small and ambulant merchants, middle managers, small consumer goods producers, rich and middling peasants, and state officials (Türk 1970, 68).

To these three groups were added the landlords, who were owners of agricultural land and relied on the labour of others (peasants and workers) to produce agricultural output. Some landlords were ruling members of traditional formations, such as clans or tribes, and relied on these relationships in order to retain their control of agricultural productive capacity. Others were capitalist landowners, for whom agricultural land was but another form of investment asset. In practical terms, the difference between the traditional landlord and the capitalist landlord was often manifested in whether she collected his profits in kind (pre-capitalist structures) or cash (capitalist structures) (Türk 1970, 111).

On the opposite end of the spectrum were the labourers, a category that included both workers (proletariats) and peasants. The proletariats were forced to sell their labour to survive, having access to no other means of production (Türk 1970, 149). Peasants worked the land to which they had usage or ownership claims. Poor peasants, those not included in the petite bourgeoisie, were of various types. Some were sharecroppers, required to provide labour and/or part of their produce to the traditional landlord. Others provided their labour to large landholders in order to

² The gradual retreat of Ottoman sovereignty over the Balkans and Caucasus during the period 1878 to 1914 and the rise in nationalist tensions in Anatolia led to movements of large numbers of Muslims from territory lost by the Empire into Anatolia and Turkish Rumelia and of Christians from areas still under Ottoman rule to the newly founded states of the Balkans and the Russian Empire (Zürcher 2012, 164). Under the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, Turkey engaged to protect the rights of three minority groups (Armenians, Jews, and the Greeks of Istanbul), while all other Greek-Orthodox residents of the country would be exchanged with Greece for its resident Muslim population. Continual problems in the implementation of the Treaty's provisions for the protection of minorities in both countries led to the departure of many minority residents not covered by the population exchange stipulations and further reduced the size of minority communities in Turkey (Çağaptay 2006, 28-31).

supplement the meagre incomes of their own plots of land (Türk 1970, 137-138). The 1960s also saw the emergence of village labourers, a form of landless poor peasant forced to provide labour to landholders for want of any holding of their own (Türk 1970, 145). These peasants were effectively the proletariat of rural Turkey, forming the most disadvantaged and disenfranchised stratum of social structure of agricultural regions.

With the structure of the Turkish class system in mind, it is now possible to question the role of the class system in the formulation of the Junta's rhetoric and its policies. In particular, the two core targets identified by the military as the motivation for its actions: price instability and the breakdown in law and order.

The Twin Evils: Inflation and Insecurity

Scholars and historians³ widely accept that Turkey, at the end of the 1970s, was faced by two threats to the stability and prosperity of the country: political violence and economic crisis (Zürcher 2012, 267). In the view of Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, these two phenomena were not independent of one another, but rather components of a causal relationship. In a public statement published in 1982, Evren stated explicitly that the fall in industrial production in Turkey immediately prior to the 1980 coup was the effect of "anarchy, strikes, lockouts and other social disturbances" (Evren 1982, 262). The implication is that the events of the period beginning on 12 September 1980 restored the country to a long-term path of economic growth through the re-establishment of law and order. The conclusions proposed by the military régime conform to economic theory: uncertainty in the supply of labour caused a drop in production. However, such discourse ignores the continuity of economic policy – or rather economic reform – before and after the coup. Indeed, following the events of 12 September 1980, the Generals opted to reinstate Turgut Özal as the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Matters and to allow him to continue implementation of the economic stabilisation package he had brokered with the IMF in January 1980. Indeed, Zürcher has suggested that increased anti-government activity on the part of trade unions and leftist activists was not only a motivating factor in the pursuit of economic reforms, but that it was also a response to the perceived negative effects that such reforms would have on the labouring population (2012, 267-268). It is thus evident that restoration of order and economic restructuring were not quite as related as the Generals suggested.

³ For example, Belge, 1992; Çakmakçı 2007, 705; Çeçen 1994, 44; Keyder 1990, 205 and 217; Mango 1980; Özdemir 1989.

While the political violence of the 1970s was indeed related to workers and left-wing movements, it was motivated by much more than industrial grievances. A deepened sense of enfranchisement and politicisation among workers characterised the post-1960 period of rapid industrialisation (Ünsaldı 2005, 108). Throughout the two decades following the 1960 coup, the deracinated and dispossessed proletarian classes of the slum communities (*gecekondular*) became more involved in electoral politics and political violence. The instability that resulted from this trend was of acute concern for all classes in Turkish society (Ünsaldı 2005, 108). Nevertheless, its effect was felt disproportionately by urban proletariats and peasants (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 223). The Generals' assertion, therefore, that they were motivated by a desire to end anarchy provided a convenient means of appealing to the population as a whole and the working classes in particular.

Meanwhile, the claim that political violence was responsible for economic stagnation allowed the coup régime to decouple its economic interventions from class discourse. Evidence from a variety of sources⁴ indicates that, although industrial action did indeed affect productive capacity in the 1970s (Ünsaldı 2005, 107), economic discontent and conflict were also the effects, rather than the causes, of stagnation. Moreover, this dissatisfaction was not limited to the relationship between workers and managers or capitalists. Ünsaldı has identified confrontations between rural petit bourgeois producers and larger-scale producers with access to imported inputs (which were responsible for balance of payments crises during the 1970s) as symptomatic of the breakdown in the Turkish development model (2005, 105-107). Such balance of payments problems also spurred inflation, as they required the government, under Demirel, to contract shorter- and shorter-term debt at higher interest rates in order to continue importing capital inputs necessary for industrial transformation (Kalfa 1986, 172). It is thus apparent that the economic woes facing Turkey by the end of the decade affected more than one stratum of society, but that their impact was not felt equally across the class spectrum. Moreover, any attempt to address such problems in a meaningful way would have serious repercussions on considerable sections of the population, most noticeably those who benefitted from the ISI system: large producers oriented to the domestic market.

In response to the economic troubles faced by the Turkish economy, the Generals sought to reinvigorate the implementation of the IMF-sponsored reforms initiated in January 1980. The reforms were drafted on the assumption that loose monetary policy, "government intervention in the economy", and inflationary wage expectations on the part of workers were responsible for runaway inflation. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data, however, indicates that the inflationary pressure of wages on the general price level was never as important as

⁴ See also Boratav 1989, 332; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1992, 724-726; Keyder 1992, 192.

that of profits (Saybaşılı 1992, 177-178). Despite this, considerable pressure was exerted to compress wages, largely through the banning of union activity and industrial action by workers (Çakmakçı 2007, 707). Wages both as a motivating component of inflation and a proportion of national income collapsed and inflation was brought under control at the expense of workers' incomes.

The military régime's discourse was therefore about political violence and anarchy and its effects on the general state of the Turkish economy. The goal was to create sympathy throughout the Turkish population. The generals sought to win the support of the proletariats and peasants in particular, as they were the classes most adversely affected by both rising levels of violence and stagflation. The link between violence and stagnation established by the régime provided legitimacy for an anti-inflationary policy that was, in effect, counter to the interests of the workers and to the benefit of the bourgeoisie. This process mirrors Poulantzas' assertion that Bonapartist régimes will speak on the part of the dominated class while acting in the interests of the dominant (Poulantzas 1982, 286). This does not mean, however, that all sections of the dominant classes benefited from the Junta's actions. Indeed, the Generals were only really interested in one particular sub-group of the bourgeoisie: the exporters.

Oriented to Export Development and the Exporting Bourgeoisie

The Junta was quick in implementing measures designed to tackle Turkey's economic woes, which included measures such as the devaluation of the Turkish lira (Keyder 1990, 176). While such an action would normally be associated with inflationary pressures, it was countered by a gradual reduction in the circulating money supply (Evren 1982, 267). The combined effect of these two measures was to make Turkish exports more attractive in global markets and to deliver a further blow to wage-earners, who faced inflationary pressures in import prices and a downward trend in labour income (Çeçen 1994, 45). These actions were, on the whole, beneficial to export-oriented sectors of the economy, such as mining and manufacturing, despite the painful implications for large swathes of Turkish society (Evren 1982, 262). A decrease in money supply might have also translated into a reduction in operating credit for business, but the Generals confirmed in a public statement that business borrowing actually increased following their intervention (possibly because of increased producer confidence related to law and order), allowing for a continuation of productive and commercial activity (Evren 1982, 269).

The Junta also took steps to allow for a limited return to the formation of associations and chambers intended to better organise the country's productive capacities. In these measures, it was once again the export sector that benefited most from the Generals' relaxation of the restrictions on public associations. TÜSİAD, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, was the first such group permitted to re-open, ostensibly to explain the goals and policies of the new régime in Washington (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 224). TÜSİAD and its presence in Washington also allowed for the Junta to signal a shift in Turkish policy regarding foreign trade and economic liberalisation. Among the measures pursued by the new government and encouraged by the IMF was a liberalisation of the country's tariff structure and restrictions on capital flows, as well as a disavowal of ISI, a common prescription from the Washington Consensus. The economic liberalism imposed by the régime permitted a new era of competition and capital accumulation that particularly favoured those with links to export-oriented industries (Keyder 1990, 177). Indeed, the military appeared to rely considerably on the success of these outward-looking firms to help restart economic growth badly damaged by the unrest of the 1970s (Singer 1984, 164).

Small, domestically-oriented producers, who benefitted from a protected economy, were affected negatively by the new measures (Keyder 1990, 176-177). They were initially supportive of the new régime's policies, as they perceived the entire package to be favourable to employers and management (Çakmakçı 2007, 707). Later on, the petite bourgeoisie remained supportive of the military régime, despite its negative impacts on their economic interests, out of a desire to protect hard-won economic stability. Indeed, there was a general understanding that the economic pain suffered by the population was a necessary component of the campaign to restore order (Keyder 1990, 177). Despite this, and despite the régime's rhetoric, the general well-being of the Turkish population in economic terms was far from secure even after the restoration of parliamentary democracy (Habora 1989, 7).

The net effect of the military's intervention on 12 September 1980 was thus the slow elimination of small, domestically-oriented producers, who were the faction of the dominant bourgeoisie not favoured by the Generals. As Poulantzas' model suggested, the new régime had crushed the dominated classes and purged the bourgeoisie of its weaker factions. In doing so, it sought to mask the class-based effects of its policies through an appeal to supra-class interests. It achieved this through its usage of a discourse of national salvation.

Of the Nation, For the Nation, Above the Nation

In 1982, General Evren explained the military's intervention in the democratic process as having been motivated by "the way the Turkish citizens sharing the same religious and national values, have been divided into opposing camps of hostility for the sake of political interests" (1982, 219). In other words, the military had overthrown the democratically elected government in order to save the country from itself. The military's narrative of national unity was an important component in its attempt to paint its actions as autonomous from both the class and political struggles waged throughout the 1970s. One means of doing so was to insist on the broad appeal of both nationalism and Islamic values. The focus on Islam was not only a means of instilling conservative views in the country's youth; it was also an important bridge between social groups that had become fractured along ideological and class lines, such as Turks and Kurds, and Sunnis and Alevi (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 223).

With respect to national identity, the Junta's actions were much less nuanced than with religion. Turkish ethno-national identity provided a convenient means of stressing the régime's commitment to supra-class values and to Kemalism. It thus sought to capture the definition of Turkishness and the parameters of belonging as key components of their post-coup ideological platform. Both the Turkish Language Institute and the Turkish History Institute were closed by the Generals in an attempt to bring official rhetoric on the Kemalist revolution entirely under their own control (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 226). Nationalism was also an effective tool for convincing those who were opposed to religious values of the wisdom of the intervention. Apologists for the Generals used the spectre of the Treaty of Sèvres⁵, an oft-evoked catchphrase for foreign-backed separatism, as a hypothetical alternative to the military coup (Burçak 1988, 5). Such pronouncements were to some degree effective, particularly in persuading those who were natural supporters of both the left and right wing parties – the urban proletariats – of the necessity of military intervention (Kalfa 1986, 182).

⁵ The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente, ended the hostilities of the First World War between the signatories. In addition to the establishment of British and French Mandates in the Arab Provinces of the Empire, it foresaw territorial concessions in Anatolia to Greece and Armenia, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan, and British, French, and Italian spheres of economic interest over large swathes of the rest of Anatolia. The Treaty would have resulted in drastically reduced sovereignty for the government of the Ottoman Empire and caused considerable protest and public consternation throughout the Empire. Reaction to the Treaty provided impetus for agitation against the occupation forces of the Entente. The Treaty of Sèvres was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne, negotiated by the government in Ankara on behalf of the Empire, following the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922. The Treaty of Sèvres is often invoked by Turkish nationalists as a by-word for foreign attempts to encourage secessionist movements within the Republic of Turkey (Zürcher 2012, 147).

The military did not rely solely on religious and nationalist arguments in order to justify itself. In explaining its decision to abrogate parliamentary democracy, rather than simply enforce a state of emergency through draconian measures, its leaders took considerable steps to characterise political parties, bureaucrats and the unions as divisive, self-interested and destructive. The union leaders had misled the ignorant workers with fiery language and pictures of “foreigners” (Evren 1982, 220). The bureaucracy, meanwhile, had been thoroughly politicised by the parties in power and had ceased to operate in the interest of the people and the State (Evren 1982, 227). For General Evren, action was necessary before the Army itself was “contaminated” by the rampant and fratricidal politicisation of the 1970s (Jacoby 2004, 143). What ensued was a ruthless campaign of purges against civil servants at all levels, usually based on information provided by co-workers (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 226). Of the trade unions, only Türk-İş – which primarily represented public sector workers (Akar, Bilâ and Birand 1999, 225) - was allowed to recommence its operations after the coup, although it was barred from any form of political activity (Jacoby 2004, 144). Indeed, the TÜSİAD and other employers’ organisations encouraged the régime to pursue the eradication of any ideological motivations within the syndicalist movement, and to keep all workers’ organisations focused on wages and working conditions only (Çakmakçı 2007, 707). The ultimate goal of the military was to create a “class-free society”, as well as a depoliticised one, in which stability and preservation of both the State and the Nation were paramount, even at the expense of the people themselves (Keyder 1990, 176).

For Poulantzas, this “autonomy” of the State is one of the crucial characteristics of the Bonapartist régime. While the State portrays itself as above class and group politics, it is not in fact acting as an arbitrator between the various factions (Poulantzas 1982, 262). Rather, it provides an element of stability within which a preferred faction of the dominant class (in this case, the export-oriented bourgeoisie) may establish its supremacy over the other factions of the dominant class (Poulantzas 1982, 285). In the case of post-coup Turkey, it is evident that the Generals were at pains to create an aura of de-politicisation around their administration. Despite this, their actions, and particularly the policies that they adopted in the economic sphere, were clearly skewed in favour of a particular segment of the bourgeoisie. This, again, is indicated within Poulantzas’ model of Bonapartism: although the State has declared itself to be an arbitrator and national saviour, the absence of any civil society organisation capable of defending the interests of the dominated classes means that no class equilibrium is either present or even possible (Poulantzas 1982, 287). The suppression of the trade unions and left-wing activism in Turkey following the 1980 coup, much as in Poulantzas’ description, left the workers with little or no means of countering economic reforms that

were clearly detrimental to their well-being (Ünsaldı 2005, 114). Despite its claims, the State acted neither impartially, nor in the interest of the nation as a whole.

Defeated Without Even Knowing It

In this paper, I have demonstrated that the 1980 coup in Turkey and its impact on Turkish society can be explained meaningfully through recourse to the Bonapartist model of governance, as described by the political scientist Nicos Poulantzas. In particular, the post-coup régime's Bonapartism is evident in three separate ways: its adoption of inflation control and the restoration of law and order as justifications for imposing draconian restrictions on civil liberties and harsh economic reforms; its patronage of export-oriented capitalists at the expense of other sections of the bourgeoisie; and its use of a discourse based on national interests to legitimise its actions. Together, these three aspects of the régime point to a desire to strengthen a faction of the bourgeoisie under the veneer of the military's traditional role of saviour of the nation.

One might ask why the military faced so little opposition to its actions, given the progressively more painful sacrifices it asked of the proletariat, the peasant, and small producers. In part, violent suppression of dissent and a mask of benevolence toward the labouring classes quelled opposition. However, an answer might also be found in the national goals inculcated by successive Kemalist governments and adopted by a number of social classes: Europeanisation and Modernisation. While the proletarian classes sought these ends through parliamentary democracy and enfranchisement, the grande bourgeoisie saw economic liberalisation as the best path to follow (Keyder 1990, 179). As the bourgeoisie gained the upper hand through the implementation of Özal's structural adjustment package, it found it easier to portray the results of the coup in a language of modernity and European identity that also matched, at least partly, the narrative of the workers' struggle. It was this portrayal that allowed for such a smooth transition back to electoral democracy in 1983, despite three years of brutal and bloody repression of workers' movements.

The return to democracy occurred within a radically new constitutional paradigm that centralised political activity and discourse within the parliamentary system, rather than civil society. The purging of ideological elements from both the bureaucracy and the trade unions ensured that only the elected government and the state would have command over political competition in the country. Thus Poulantzas' schematic was complete: the dissolution of military rule allowed for the triumphant segment of the bourgeoisie to extend its control over the political system and thus the apparatus of the state, to the detriment of the workers, peasants and small producers. A desire to

participate in the determination of the country's future was waged almost exclusively through access to and competition within the electoral system, rather than the trade unions or other civil society organisations of the 1970s. The Junta had cleared the way for the export-oriented capitalists, so besieged in the period of ISI, to have the last laugh.

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