

PRABHĀCANDRA'S STATUS IN THE HISTORY OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY

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In his now well-known 1971 work *Jaina Ontology*, K. K. Dixit very conveniently divides the history of Jaina philosophical speculation into three so-called “Ages of Logic” (88–164), after having dealt with the “Age of the Āgamas” (12–87). The word “logic” in the “Ages of Logic” may be understood as the logic of the arguments by Jaina thinkers in different periods or ages, namely their arguments both against non-Jaina views as well as those in support of their own position on philosophical issues. The ages are divided chronologically in terms of important texts by renowned thinkers.

Dixit seems to want to clearly demarcate Śvetāmbara and Digambara contributions in the different ages, so in the first period the important Śvetāmbara texts, he says on p. 89 are: Siddhasena's (c. 5th century) *Sanmati*, Mallavādin's (5th or 6th century) *Naya-cakra* and Jinabhadra's (6th or 7th century) *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*. And the first important Digambara texts of this first period are Kundakunda's (2nd or 8th century?) three *sāras* (*Pañcāsti-kāya*, *Pravacana* and *Samaya*) and Samantabhadra's (4th century) *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (p. 99: this text: “was rather poor in content, though brilliant in form”!).

The second stage is represented by the 8th century Śvetāmbara scholar-monk Haribhadra with his *Anekānta-jayapatākā*, his magnum opus, and his *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*) and the Digambaras Akalaṅka (8th century, *Rāja-vārtika*, *Aṣṭaśatī*, *Laghīyas-traya*, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha* and *Siddhi-viniścaya*) and Vidyānanda [Vidyānandin] (9th century, *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* and *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*), the last of this stage.

The third stage is represented by the Digambara Prabhācandra (11th century, *Nyāyakumuda-candra*, a commentary on Akalaṅka's 8th century *Laghīyas-traya*, and *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa*, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's 11th century *Parīkṣā-mukha*), the Śvetāmbaras Abhayadeva (also 11th century, *Sanmati-ṭīkā*), Vādideva (12th century, *Syādvāda-ratnākara*) and Yaśovijaya (17th century, *Naya-rahasya*, *Anekāntavyavasthā*, *Nayo-padeśa* [on *anekāntavāda*] and *Tarka-bhāṣā* and *Jñāna-bindu* [on *pramāṇa*]).

It is significant that the Digambara Prabhācandra is the first in the third stage, because he would be the link from the second stage to those who came after him. So, for example Vādideva's *Syād-vāda-ratnākara* resembles Prabhācandra's PKM closely.

The threefold division of the ages of logic, in contrast to the age of the Āgamas, is based on the view that certain tendencies characterise the age of logic. These are:

- i. to vindicate the doctrine of *anekāntavāda*
- ii. to establish a particular doctrine of *pramāṇas*
- iii. to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views
- iv. to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views (Dixit, p. 106).

All this means that the age of Logic is divisible into three parts, viz.:

- i. that related to the doctrine of *anekāntavāda*
- ii. that related to the doctrine of *pramāṇas*
- iii. that related to the traditional Jaina philosophical views (Dixit, p. 107).

This threefold division of the age of logic takes into account 12 thinkers and 25 works from about the fourth to the seventeenth centuries. The advantage of this classification is that it groups together a specific number of thinkers and texts in order to facilitate an over-view of Jaina speculation on specific themes directly or indirectly related to Jaina ontology, namely a vindication of *anekāntavāda*, the development of the doctrine of *pramāṇas* and a defence of traditional Jaina philosophical views. That the scheme is practical may be seen in the fact that although Māṇikyanandin's 11th century *Parīkṣā-mukha* is conspicuous by its absence, Prabhācandra's *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* in the third age is mentioned, which is a commentary on it. One could argue that the scheme is an over-simplification of thirteen centuries of Jaina speculation and disregards a vast amount of speculation by other thinkers. This would no doubt be true. If thinkers are left out (e.g. Māṇikyanandin, just mentioned) and many important works ignored (Vidyānandin's *Satya-sāsana-parīkṣā* and *Āpta-parīkṣā*), we certainly get a limited picture. In other words, Dixit's work has to be consulted with caution and exhaustive supplementation. Moreover, many of Dixit's remarks have to be carefully weighed in the light of their contrariness and opinionatedness, as for example in the case of Prabhācandra.

Some Statements about Prabhācandra in K. K. Dixit's *Jaina Ontology*

102: “The Digambara author who followed Vidyānanda was Prabhācandra and as has already been hinted [?] he was an inferior genius as compared to the former.”

“102: Prabhācandra too [like Vidyānanda] surveys the contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalaṅka's discoveries but his insights had its limitations. The result was that Vidyānanda gave us two of the most advanced philosophical texts coming from the pen of a Jaina [*Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* and *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*] while Prabhācandra gave us two text-books to be used by fairly gifted school-boys [*Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, a commentary on Akalaṅka's 8th century *Laghīyas-traya* and *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's 11th century *Parīkṣā-mukha*].”

“103: But certainly the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry was less comprehensive than that of Vidyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Prabhācandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyānanda, that it is a good preparation argues [for] Prabhācandra's worth, that it is only a preparation argues [for] his limitation.”

155: “[...] the Digambara Prabhācandra who followed Vidyānanda was a lesser author than the latter [...]”

156: “For he [Prabhācandra] made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times.”

“156: [...] Prabhācandra's level of discussion is decidedly less advanced than that of Vidyānanda. Of course, two questions are somewhat new in Prabhācandra. Thus in *Nyāyakumudacandra* there occurs a detailed refutation of the six Vaiśeṣika *padārthas* and the sixteen Nyāya *padārthas*, the former which is more important being repeated in *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*; (in Vidyānanda such a refutation was just hinted at). Similarly in both *Nyāyakumudacandra* and *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*

there occurs a detailed treatment of the theories of error maintained by diverse philosophical schools; (Vidyānanda is unfamiliar with this problem).”

156: “Prabhācandra’s writings should serve as a good introduction to those of Vidyānanda; (Prabhācandra’s writings have the advantage that they contain one discussion at one place).”

157: “[...] Nyāyakumudacandra is to be studied not so much for the sake of [the] light it throws on Akalaṅka’s words as for that of the independent philosophical discussions it incorporates.” Before this statement in the same paragraph Dixit says on p. 157:

“A glaring example [of not throwing light on Akalaṅka’s NKC] is ‘[...] Prabhācandra’s commentary on Akalaṅka’s famous verse ‘*jñānam ādyaṃ matiḥ sañjñā cintā cābhinibodham* etc’ [(AGT) *Pramāṇapraveśa* 10].¹ Here ‘*matiḥ*’ was a wrong reading for ‘*smṛti*’ (Vidyānanda has the correct reading) and yet Prabhācandra had no difficulty in commenting on it and in the course of it in attributing an arbitrary meaning to the phrase ‘*jñānam ādyaṃ*’.”²

Dixit is certainly entitled to his opinion but this last statement on p. 157 is quite a serious charge which challenges Prabhācandra’s status and contribution within the Jaina tradition. The rest of the paper deals with this charge in three major points.

1. It is a moot question whether Dixit is merely repeating a point already made in the introduction (*prastāvanā*) by Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī to the first volume of the NKC

¹ Balcerowicz 2005: 343 deals precisely with this stanza, the first half of which is quoted here. His concern is in a much larger context of *pramāṇa* and language with a dispute he sees among Dīnāga, Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka, and offers three interpretations of the stanza. My concern here is the *accusation* against Prabhācandra that he ‘wrongly’ reads ‘*mati*’ as ‘*smṛti*’. Balcerowicz does not seem to be concerned with this accusation at all and he does not seem to refer to it either. In wanting to ‘reinstate’ Prabhācandra’s status, my aim is to try and show that Prabhācandra interprets the terms within the Jaina tradition and in Akalaṅka’s way. The fact that Vidyānandin changes Akalaṅka’s *mati* to *smṛti* is another problem altogether. Balcerowicz does not refer to Ghosal 1940 who seems to clearly explain the problem without recourse to any particular ‘interpretation’ of the stanza. See also the Appendix below for Ghosal’s explanation.

² In n. 51 on p. 180 Dixit gives this information: “Nyāya-kumuda-candra p. 403. For Vidyānanda’s reading Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika III, 634” (= *Laghīyastraya*, AGT *Pramāṇapraveśa* 10).

who begs forgiveness (*kṣamā*) in pointing out an error (*bhrama*) in Prabhācandra's reference to the said stanza by Akalaṅka (see pp. 8f. there about *ādyā* in the sense of *kāraṇa*).³

2. Further, and in addition to the above, the introduction by Śāstrī says that *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka* and *anumāna* are in opposition to the Jaina tradition and therefore are falsely seen as *śruta* and that their cause is (erroneously) seen as *mati*. Moreover, no one in the Jaina tradition has regarded *smṛti*, etc. as *pratyakṣa* (NKC, p. 405, line 3: *smṛty-ādi-aviśadaṃ jñānaṃ śrutam ity uktam*). The next point offers a possible solution to the problem.

3. In his *Laghīyas-traya* (*Pramāṇa- Naya-* and *Pravacana-praveśas*) Akalaṅka distinguishes not only between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, but within *pratyakṣa* itself he mentions three kinds: *indriya*, *anindriya* and *atīndriya* kinds of *pratyakṣa*. In an article about “Epistemological Categories in the *Akalaṅkagranthatraya*” (AGT: *Laghīyas-traya*, *Nyāya-viniścayaḥ* and *Pramāṇa-saṅgrahaḥ*) in 2002 I tried to see diagrammatically, as given below, which *pramāṇa* belongs where in which work, including Akalaṅka's *Laghīyas-traya* of which Prabhācandra's NKC is a commentary. For our purposes we shall deal with the first part of the *Laghīyas-traya*, the *Pramāṇa-praveśa* (in 29 stanzas, divided into 4 sections), and the third, *Pravacana-praveśa* (the *Naya-praveśa* need not be consulted here).

Let us look at the relevant terms in Akalaṅka's words in the AGT:

(AGT) *Pramāṇapraveśa* 3: *pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhya-saṃvyavahārataḥ*⁴ |
parokṣaṃ śeṣa-vijñānaṃ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ || 3 ||

(AGT) *vivṛti* to *Pramāṇapraveśa* 4: *tatra sāmvyavahārikam indriyānindriya-pratyakṣam*
| mukhyam-atīndriya-jñānam |

³ In all fairness to Kailāsa Candra Śāstrī, it must be said that he is all praise for Prabhācandra and for his major contribution. Here I am highlighting the point about Prabhācandra that he ‘wrongly’ reads ‘*mati*’ as ‘*smṛti*’, because, as already mentioned, it seems to be quite a serious charge. In the introduction (*prastāvanā*) Mahendrakumār Śāstrī to volume II of the NKC, pp. 6–67, there is exhaustive information about Prabhācandra's status and his relation to other thinkers, including significant details about his time.

⁴ The *vivṛti* after stanza 4 (quoted in part below this stanza) has *sāmvyavahārikam*, which Ghoshal, p. xx, n. 1 sees as part of the stanza identified as no. 1, but the AGT p. 1 of the text numbers it 3.


(AGT) *vivṛti* to *Pravacanapraveśa* 61: [...] *anindriya-pratyakṣam smṛti-saṃjñā-cintā-abhinibodhātmakam* | [...] *śrutam parokṣam sakala-pramāṇa-prameyeyat-tāvatsvarūpābhīdhāyi bādha-rahitaṃ pramāṇa* | *atra arthāpatty-anumānopamānādīny-antarbhavanti* |

(AGT) *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* 2: *pratyakṣam viśada-jñānaṃ tridhā śrutam aviṣṭam* |

The *vivṛti* to this, with the three kinds of *pratyakṣa* in bold print, is:

*pratyakṣam viśada-jñānaṃ tattva-jñānaṃ viśadam, **indriya-pratyakṣam anindriya-pratyakṣam atīndriya-pratyakṣam tridhā*** | *śrutam aviṣṭam pratyakṣānumānāgama-nimittam* | *parokṣam pratyabhijñādi* (fn.: *pratyabhijñā smṛti ūha*) *smaraṇa-pūrvakam* |

These points can be summarised diagrammatically in this way:⁵



The basic question now is: do both Dixit and Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī do Prabhācandra an injustice? Is it possible that Prabhācandra was a bit lackadaisical at the place concerned because he should have hinted at Akalaṅka's complicated system, especially in his *Pramāṇa-praveśa*? When Prabhācandra mentions *pratyakṣa* I wonder whether in his parsimony he simply uses the word without specifically distinguishing Kundakunda's three kinds in the *vivṛti* to *Pravacana-praveśa* 61 quoted above. What needs to be done (in another study) is to analyse Prabhācandra's text more carefully to see which *pratyakṣa* he is referring to or assuming, something that Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī

⁵ From Soni 2002: 188, see also Ghoshal 1940: xxii.

should have probably done. In any case, Dixit's charge and the 'error' pointed out by Kailāśa Candra Śāstrī have to be reassessed in the light of Akalaṅka's own words. To close this section let me quote a part of Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's introduction on Akalaṅka from the *Parīkṣāmukham by Māṇikyanandī* (see also the Appendix for the entire section) for his solution to the problem:

“Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Parokṣa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmī, Akalaṅka has written that Mati, Smṛiti, Samjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these (p. xxi) remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become Parokṣa.⁶ Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka śruta is what is heard and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅkhyavahārika Pratyakṣa” (Ghoshal 1940: xx f.).

Prabhācandra's Works

Dixit notes only two works by Prabhācandra (who follows in the footsteps of Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin) that have left an indelible mark of his contribution to the history of Jaina philosophy. These are 1. the PKM, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha* and 2. the NKC, a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyas-traya*. The PKM is certainly earlier than the NKC, as Trikha (2012: 139), has pointed out: in NKC 339, 6f. Prabhācandra says that the argument he mentions there is to be found in his PKM.

In order to see more comprehensively Prabhācandra's versatile learning, it is useful to note his other works. In addition to the two works mentioned above Prabhācandra is credited with at least the following (see also PKM 13 and Mahaprajna 1984: 171):

3. *Tattvārtha-vṛtti-pada-vivaraṇa*: A commentary on Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, itself a commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*.
4. *Śabdāmbhoja-bhāskara-vṛtti*: A commentary on Pūjyapāda's *Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa*.

⁶ See the footnote to this in the appendix for the *Laghīyastraya* 10 quotation.

5. *Pravacanasāra-saroja-bhāskara*: A commentary on Kundakunda's work.
6. *Śākatāyana-nyāsa*: mentioned in Mahaprajna (1984: 171) and *Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa*.

Prabhācandra's Contribution and Significance

It has already been noted that Dixit makes contrary statements about Prabhācandra and we have tried to deal with his serious charge regarding *mati* and *smṛti*. His comments were the points of departure which inspired the cogitations here. In order to show how unconsidered his views regarding Prabhācandra are, here is a random selection of a few of his own statements to bear this out, pertaining not only to Prabhācandra but also to the Digambara contribution to Jaina and Indian philosophy. Having said this, the usefulness of his work is not in any way belittled; as already said, his study has to be used with care, as in the case of his study of Prabhācandra.

On p. 104 Dixit says that the formal structure of Vādideva's *Syād-vāda-ratnākara* resembles the PKM "in an extremely close manner" (the PKM is a commentary on the *Parīkṣā-mukha* of Māṇikyanandin), and that the commentary "closely" follows the PKM. In other words, this is a great tribute paid to the Digambara Prabhācandra for his contribution and significance by a renowned Śvetāmbara thinker like Vādideva.

The fact that Dixit says on p. 104 that "Abhayadeva was considerably indebted to his Digambara predecessors" including Prabhācandra, once again bringing out his significance. Further, he finds it "an instructive study to compare Abhayadeva's indebtedness to his great Digambara predecessors and Vādideva's indebtedness to the same" (p. 105).

It is also generally interesting to quote Dixit, p. 153:

"Akalaṅka's epistemological texts were commented upon by others before as well as after Vidyānandin; (e.g. 'Anantavīrya who commented on Siddhiviniścaya came before Vidyānanda, while Prabhācandra who commented on Laghīyastraya and Vādirāja who commented on Nyāya-viniścaya came after him)."

Dixit seems to have a high opinion of the Digambara Vidyānandin, so much so that he is prompted to say in the same place: "And yet it is Vidyānandin who deserves to be called *the* commentator of Akalaṅka's epistemological texts even if he formally commented on none of them."

Further on, on p. 156, Dixit notes with regard to the *Laghīyas-traya*: “in spite of its title, is a collection of 2 works (*sic*) which are the earliest among Akalaṅka’s independent writings”. In the available editions there are clearly three short texts, as already noted: *Pramāṇa-praveśa*, *Naya-praveśa* and *Pravacana-praveśa*.

In the same place we read this noteworthy view:

“And as we know Akalaṅka only gradually reached clarity on the question of epistemology which was the central subject-matter of his independent writings. This means that in the form of *Laghīyastraya* Prabhācandra had before him a rather raw work [“rather unsystematic”, ten lines lower down], even if a work coming from the pen of Akalaṅka. In this respect *Parīkṣāmukha* was just the opposite of *Laghīyastraya*, for the former lucidly and systematically summarises Akalaṅka’s final epistemological findings as perfected by his followers Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin.”

Dixit does not seem to appreciate the fine distinction Akalaṅka makes on *pratyakṣa*, even if others did not pursue his line of thinking.

In conclusion, one last quotation testifying to Prabhācandra as a thinker of note. Jaini JPP, 84–85, says that important works clarifying the material of texts by Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin “were the *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandin (11th century); Prabhācandra’s commentary thereon, entitled *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*, (11th century); and the same author’s substantial *Nyāyakumudacandra* commentary on Akalaṅka’s *Laghīyastraya*.”

On the basis of what has been said on and about Prabhācandra here, there is no doubt at all about his expertise. Moreover, it seems that a closer study of his works can go a long way in better understanding Akalaṅka’s complex view(s) on *pramāṇas*. Ghoshal 1940 has dealt precisely with the crucial issue in Akalaṅka concerning *mati* and *smṛti*, which is why it is being quoted in full below. His findings are evidently useful for further studies.

Appendix

Ghoshal 1940: *Parīkṣāmukham by Māṇikyanandī*, on Akalaṅka from the Introduction, pp. xix–xxiv (pp. xxii and xxiii contain charts of *pramāṇa* according to Akalaṅka and Umāsvāmī respectively).

“[p. xix] It is of the utmost importance to remember that except in the Jaina Nyāya, we nowhere find knowledge derived from the senses called Parokṣa Pramāṇa. In Hindu Nyāya philosophy [fn. 4 quotes *Nyāya-sūtra* 1. 1. 4, *indriyārtha-sannikarśotpannaṃ* (...)] and in all other Hindu Śāstras, knowledge derived from the senses is known as Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Akalaṅka the greatest of Jain logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He accepted Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as two Pramāṇas but instead of dividing Pratyakṣa into Śākala and Vikala, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions viz. [p. xx] Sāṅvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakṣa [n. 1 quotes *Laghīyastraya* Verse 1, read 3: see also n. 2 above]. He further laid down that Mati Jñāna derived through the senses and mind is not Parokṣa but Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.⁷ As Mati came to be recognised as Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa, its co-related Smṛiti, Saṃjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mentioned by Umāsvāmī also came under the same head. But a subtle distinction was made by Akalaṅka. He subdivided Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa into two heads (a) Indriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the senses) under which came Mati and (b) Anindriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the mind)⁸ under which came Smṛiti, Saṃjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha⁹ as mind is prevalent in these four. This change necessitated a change of definition of Pratyakṣa and Akalaṅka accordingly defined Pratyakṣa as ‘clear knowledge.’ (*‘Pratyakṣam viśadam jñānam.’*)

Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Parokṣa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmī, Akalaṅka has written that Mati, Smṛiti, Saṃjñā, Chintā, and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these [p. xxi] remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become

⁷ Ghoshal quotes Akalaṅka’s *Nyāya-viniścaya* Verse 93: *ādye parokṣam aparaṃ pratyakṣam prāhur añjasā | kevalam loka-buddhyaiva mater lakṣaṇa saṅgrahaḥ ||* In the AGT ed. this is stanza 474 bc and 475 ab, p. 93.

⁸ Ghoshal quotes the *vivṛti* on *Laghīyastraya* 4 (= *Pramāṇapraveśa* 4, as given above as well): *tatra sāṅvyavahārikam indriyānindriya-pratyakṣam |* in his n. 3, p. xx.

⁹ Ghohal quotes the *vivṛti* to *Laghīyastraya* 61 (= *Pravacanapraveśa* 61, as given above as well): *... anindriya-pratyakṣam smṛti-saṃjñā-cintā-abhinibodhātmakam |*

Parokṣa.¹⁰ Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka śruta is what is heard and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

The peculiarity of Akalaṅka is that under Śruta in Parokṣa Pramāṇa he has two subdivisions Akṣarātmaka and Anaṣarātmaka. Other Jain logicians have mentioned that Anumāna (inference) is of two kinds Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) and Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others). Akalaṅka says that it is not inference alone that has these two subdivisions but other Pramāṇas also may be for Svārtha and Parārtha. Svārthānumāna is accepted by Akalaṅka to be included Anaṣarātmaka Śruta Pramāṇa as no help of words is necessary for its acceptance and Parārthānumāna according to Akalaṅka comes within Akṣarātmaka Anumāna as this cannot arise without the help of words. The Pramāṇas Arthāpatti, Āgama etc. are all recognised by Akalaṅka to be varieties of Śruta Pramāṇa.

The following tables will illustrate the difference between the divisions of Pramāṇa by the oldest writers such as Umāsvāmi and Akalaṅka. [Given on pp. xxii f.]

[p. xxiv] The writers who followed Akalaṅka (such as Ananta-vīrya, Vidyānanda etc.) did not accept Smṛiti etc. as Anindriya-pratyakṣa though in one sense they were ready to accept knowledge derived through the senses to be Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.”

¹⁰ Ghoshal quotes *Laghīyastraya* 10 (= *Pramāṇapraveśa* 10): *jñānam ādyaṃ matiḥ saṃjñā cintā cābhinibodham | prānnāma-yojanāc-cheṣaṃ śrutam śabdānuyojanāt* || In the AGT ed. this is 10 cd and 11 ab, p. 4.

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